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Feichtinger: RICO's Enterprise Element: Redefining or Paraphrasing to Death?

RICO'S ENTERPRISE ELEMENT: REDEFINING OR
PARAPHRASING TO DEATH?
The term 'enterprise' under RICO is one of those subjects that the more it is
explained-at least in the abstract-the more elusive it becomes, and there is
the danger of paraphrasingthe term to death.'
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine a local gang or group of individuals banded together
repeatedly for the common purpose of distributing selling cocaine.
The profits of the illicit drug sales are used to buy more drugs. While
these illegal drug activities could be prosecuted under Minnesota's
criminal statutes, prosecutors in Minnesota would be unlikely to
establish a successful claim under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).2 The criminal activities would not
be considered beyond what is necessary to constitute the elements of
the underlying drug offenses.
Amidst years of debate in the federal courts over the construction of
RICO,' different tests have emerged among the circuit courts to prove

1. State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191, 196 n.7 (Minn. 1994).
2. See infra part II.D.
3. Racketeering is defined as "[a] ctivities of organized criminals who extort money
from legitimate businesses by violence or other forms of threats or intimidation or
conduct of illegal enterprises such as gambling, narcotics traffic, or prostitution."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1258 (6th ed. 1991). The U.S. Department ofJustice defined
organized crime as including "any group of individuals whose primary activity involves
violating criminal laws to seek illegal profits and power by racketeering activities and,
when appropriate, engaging in intricate financial manipulations." NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMrITEE ON CRIUMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE

ON ORGANIZED CRIME 213 (1976); see also Sen. McClellan's congressional testimony, 116
CONG. REc. 18,940 (daily ed.June 9, 1970) (noting that organized crime is not a precise
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a RICO cause of action. The debate focuses on two of the main RICO
elements, establishment of an "enterprise" and proof of a "pattern of
racketeering activity."4 The different tests developed primarily due to
each circuit's interpretation of the statutory definition of "enterprise,"
and the quantum of proof required to meet this element.'
Minnesota recently adopted the Eighth Circuit's stringent test for the
determination of an enterprise,6 and applied that test in State v. Kelly.7
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, modified one of the
enterprise requirements of the Eighth Circuit's test. In Kelly, the court
considered whether the defendant, a pimp, was associated with a
criminal enterprise and engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.'
The supreme court held that Kelly's prostitution activities were
insufficient proof of racketeering and reversed the appellate court's
decision and Kelly's RICO conviction.9
This Case Note will show that the Kelly court correctly applied the
new Minnesota RICO test to determine the existence of an enterprise.
This new test modifies the former test to focus more on the activities
committed by the enterprise rather than the structure of the organization. However, this Case Note will explain that this is not the test
Minnesota courts should be using to determine the existence of an
enterprise. This Case Note will describe how the court's new test may
require greater proof than is mandated under the federal statute, and
why Minnesota should adopt a broader test to prove the existence of
a RICO enterprise. In sum, the Minnesota Supreme Court should
adopt the test that the majority of federal circuit courts use to establish
a RICO enterprise.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Origins of RICO

The origins of RICO, dating back to the 1930s and 1940s, are found
in congressional concerns about the influence of organized crime on

legal concept, unlike crimes such as murder, rape or robbery).
4. See infra text accompanying note 25 for discussion of RICO elements.

5. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994) (providing that an "'enterprise' includes any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.").
6. State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191, 196 (Minn. 1994) (citing United States v.
Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 855 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982)).

7. 519 N.W.2d 202 (Minn. 1994). Kelly was decided the same day as Huynh.
8. Kely, 519 N.W.2d at 203-04.
9. Id. at 205 (noting that the episodic association between Kelly and the
prostitutes and the lack of any organization beyond commission of the prostitution
crimes were insufficient to constitute a RICO offense).
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the U.S. economy.'0 In 1951, and again in 1963, congressional
studies reported that the Mafia had infiltrated legitimate businesses in
the United States." Two years later, in 1965, a bill targeting membership in organized crime, including the Mafia, was introduced for the
first time in the Senate.1 2 The bill, however, was criticized as uncon-

10. The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, created by
President Hoover following Prohibition, was the first commission to study and
document organized crime in the United States. In its 1931 report, the Commission
recommended an immediate, comprehensive, and scientific inquiry into organized
crime. For a historical discussion of the effects of organized crime on the U.S.
economy, see DONALD R. CRESsEY, THEFT OF THE NATION: THE STRUCTURE AND
OPERATIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 72-107 (1969). For a detailed legislative
history of RICO and its predecessor bills and congressional committees, see G. Robert
Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic
Concepts-Criminaland Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014-21 (1980); Craig M.
Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837,
838-45 (1980); see also Thomas S. O'Neill, Note, Functions of the RICO Enterprise Concept,
64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 646, 653 n.30 (1989) (explaining the progression of bills
leading up to the passage of RICO).
11. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 10, at 1014-15; see also THE PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OFJUSTICE: TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED
CRIME 11 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. The Task Force found renewed
public interest in prosecution of organized crime in the 1950s following a national
conference on "organized gangster syndicates" convened by the U.S. Attorney General,
and the discovery of a meeting of top organized crime leaders in Apalachin, New York.
Id.
In 1951, a congressional committee, headed by Sen. Estes Kefauver, reported that
a national crime syndicate known as the Mafia was operating throughout the United
States, controlling legitimate as well as illegitimate businesses. SeeS. REP. NO. 2370,81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1950). In the committee's final report to Congress, the committee
predicted the spread of organized crime into the illegal drug trade. STAFF OF SENATE
SPECIAL COMM., 82ND CONG., IST SESS., FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SPECIAL COMM.

TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE 3-4, 24-37 (Comm. Print.

1951); see also Lesley Suzanne Bonney, Comment, The Prosecutionof Sophisticated Urban
Street Gangs:A PrperApplicationof RICO, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 579, 587-88 (1993) (noting
that in the wake of the Mafia's increasing influence on the U.S. marketplace, RICO was
created to give law enforcement and prosecutors a means to successfully combat
organized crime). See generally Bradley, supra note 10, at 837-38 (discussing RICO's
enactment in response to substantial evidence and testimony indicating that organized
crime was a serious economic threat that needed to be destroyed).
Further study of organized crime continued into the 1960s, largely due to the
efforts of Sen. John McClellan. See Bonney, supra,at 587-90. In 1963, Sen. McClellan
chaired a special study commission on organized crime and, during subsequent Senate
hearings, Congress and the public heard disturbing testimony about the extensive
structure and reach of organized crime from member Mafia leaderJoseph Valachi. See
Bradley, supra note 10, at 837. For the testimony of Valachi, see Organized Crime and
Illicit Traffic in Narcotics: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the
Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 78-119 (1963).
12. Hearings on S. 2187 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proceduresof the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess. 29 (1966).
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stitutional and ultimately tabled by Congress.'
Then in 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, also known as the Katzenbach Commission," called for a heightened governmental response to fight
organized crime. 5 The Commission identified the four most prevalent means by which organized crime infiltrated and controlled
legitimate business concerns.' 6 In response to the Katzenbach
Commission's task force report, Congress introduced a number of bills
aimed at combating
the influence of organized crime on the American
7
economy.1
In 1969, Sen. John McClellan, along with cosponsors Senators
Hruska, Ervin and Allen, introduced Senate Bill 30, the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1969.1' The bill incorporated a number of the
Katzenbach Commission's recommendations, for example, broad
coverage of organized crime issues including grand juries, immunity,
contempt, false statements, depositions, and sentencing of dangerous
offenders.' 9
Senate Bill 1861, the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969, was also
introduced in Congress as an effort to fight organized crime. 0 This
bill, RICO's immediate predecessor, was drafted and sponsored by

13. See O'Neill, supra note 10, at 650-51 (describing criticism of the bill for
penalizing membership in criminal organizations like the Mafia).
14. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 200-09 (1967). The
commission was created on July 23, 1965.
15. Id. at 190. In its 340-page report, the President's Commission discussed the
growing influence of organized crime and the inability of traditional criminal laws and
law enforcement methods to curb the problem. Id. at 187-200. The Commission
reported that the economic cost of organized crime was double that of all other crimes,
and its economic power in the United States was virtually unlimited. Id. at 31-35.
16. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 4. The four methods of criminal
influence in legitimate businesses included the investment of concealed profits acquired
from gambling and other illegal enterprises, acceptance of business interests in payment
of the owner's gambling debts, foreclosure on usurious loans, and use of various forms
of extortion. Id.
17. Sen. Roman Hruska sponsored two bills which were designed to target
organized crime with anti-trust remedies. S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 2049,
90th. Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); see Bradley, supra note 10, at 840-42. Companion bills
were introduced in the House by Rep. Richard Poff. See H.R. 11,266, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967); H.R. 11,268, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Although these proposed bills

were ultimately tabled, the findings and recommendations of the President's
Commission were not ignored. See Blakey &,Gettings, supra note 10, at 1017-21.
18.

See S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).

See id.; see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 10, at 1017. Later that session,
Sen. Hruska also sponsored Senate Bill 1623, the Criminal Activities Profits Act, a
recasting of his bills from two years earlier. See S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
20. See S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
19.
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Senators McClellan and Hruska to "deal with the infiltration or
management of legitimate organizations" by racketeering activity or
investment of racketeering profits.21 Following extensive testimony,
including recommendations from the Department ofJustice on Senate
Bill 1861, this bill became part of Senate Bill 30.22
Finally, after further revisions by the Senate and House, Congress
passed Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, which was
signed into law on October 15, 1970.23 The purpose of the Act was
"to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to2 4deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime."
B.

Federal RICO Test for an Enterprise

A substantive violation of the federal RICO statute requires the
following proof: (1) the existence of an enterprise whose activities
affect interstate or foreign commerce; (2) that the defendant used
income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an
interest in or operate an enterprise; and (3) that the defendant
participated in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity, or conspired to engage in such conduct.25 Thus,
the prosecution of a RICO claim focuses essentially on the proof
required to establish the key elements of an "enterprise" and a "pattern
of racketeering activity."
To secure a RICO conviction, the government must prove that the
defendant committed a series of criminal acts, or predicate crimes,
constituting a pattern of racketeering. 6 A federal statute 18 U.S.C.

21. See id.; see also Bradley, supra note 10, at 840.
22. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 10, at 1019-20. Senate Bill 1861 was
incorporated into Senate Bill 30 as Title IX. The bill passed the Senate seventy-three
to one and was sent to the House. Id. at 1019 n.61. Although there were attempts by
the House to narrow the bill's scope, including the definition of pattern of racketeering
activity, none succeeded. Id. at 1020.
23. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, enacted as part of Title
IX of the Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994)).
24. Id.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1994).

26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The federal RICO statute did not create a new
substantive offense because criminal activities punishable under RICO are also
punishable under existing federal and state laws. RICO encompasses a variety of federal
and state crimes which can form the pattern of racketeering activity. To protect against
overuse or abuse of RICO by federal prosecutors, RICO prosecutions must be approved
by the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the U.S. Department of Justice.
ALEXANDER S. WHITE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND
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section 1961, describes state and federal felonies that constitute
racketeering activity.27 Racketeering activity is defined as "any act or
threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance ... which is chargeable under State law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year," in addition to
a variety of related federal offenses.s These criminal acts must be
related and amount to a current or future threat of further criminal
activity.29 Furthermore, the pattern of racketeering activity must
consist of at least two predicate crimes, "one of which occurred after
the effective date of this Chapter and the [other] which occurred
within ten years... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity."o
In addition, the government must prove the existence of an
enterprise, which is also defined in section 1961 as including "any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity.""1 The statute describes, essentially, two types of RICO
enterprises: legal entities and association-in-fact enterprises.
A RICO enterprise is also characterized by its members having a
common or shared purpose, where there is some sort of hierarchical,
decision-making structure, and where the enterprise is ongoing, with
some continuity of personnel.32 Congressional concern over enterprise criminality is reflected in the language of section 1962, which
prohibits any person "employed by or associated with any enterprise ... [from] conduct[ing] or participat[ing] ... in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity."

CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS

(RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS

(1985)

(detailing guidelines for use of RICO by federal prosecutors).

27. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) (1994).
28. § 1961(1)(a)-(d).
29. § 1962(a)-(d).
30.

§ 1961(5).

31. § 1961(4). The term "enterprise" includes private businesses, labor unions,
government agencies, as well as "groups of individuals informally organized for a
common purpose." See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 10, at 1025.
32. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); see also Michael A.
Gardiner, Comment, The Entepise Requirement: Getting to the Heart of Civil RICO, 1988
WIs. L. REv. 663, 677-78 (1988); David M. Ludwick, RestridingRICO: Narrowingthe Scope
of the Enteprise,2 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 381, 388-89 (1993); O'Neill, supra note 10,
at 762, 707.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). There are four criminal violations proscribed by the
federal RICO statute in § 1962: (a) prohibition of use or investment of the proceeds of
a pattern of racketeering activity, (b) prohibition of the acquisition of or maintenance
of an interest in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of
criminal activity or collection of unlawful debts; (c) prohibition of conducting the affairs
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In sum, it is this broad definition of a RICO enterprise that has
generated much litigation and debate in the federal courts over the
proper scope of a RICO enterprise, particularly association-in-fact
enterprises.-"
RICO was used minimally by federal prosecutors in the 1970s and,
consequently, there were few decisions in the federal courts discussing
the statute.35 Early decisions by the lower federal courts applied
RICO only to legitimate businesses or legal entities owned, operated
or infiltrated by organized crime 3 6 In the mid-1970s, however, a
dispute began over whether the Act also reached illegitimate businesses.
The first federal court case to decide that RICO's legislative history
was intended to encompass illegitimate business concerns was United
States v. Cappetto..7 The following year in 1annelli v. United States,"8
of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity
or collection of unlawful debt; and (d) prohibition of conspiring to commit any of the
above acts. § 1962.
34. This broad definition can be of little guidance, since "[e]ssentially, an
association-in-fact is what the pleader makes it, so long as the Turkette requirements are
met. In their efforts to contain litigators' imaginations, courts are developing various
rules for the enterprise element to restrict its scope." O'Neill, supra note 10, at 664.
Commentators have described the problem as one of separateness or distinctiveness
between the enterprise and pattern of racketeering elements. See Emily R. Donovan et
al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 549, 564-66
(1995); Gardiner, supra note 32, at 682-84; Ludwick, supra note 32, at 387-98; Eric P.
Israel, Of Racketeers, RICO, The Enterprise-PatternSeparatenessIssue and Chicken Little: What's
Really Falling, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 565, 582-92 (1988); O'Neill, supra note 10, at 708-13,
709 n.283 (noting that the Supreme Court in Turkette rejected the reasoning used by
the Eighth Circuit to reach its conclusion in Bledsoe requiring distinctiveness); David
Vitter, Comment, The RICO Enterprise as Distinctfrom the Pattern of RacketeeringActivity:
Clarifying the Minority View, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1419, 1424-30 (1988).
35. See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1364 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981) (noting that prosecutors' reluctance to use RICO in the
1970s "no doubt stemmed in part from its complexity and the fear of unleashing a
Pandora's box of statutory interpretation problems"); see also Lisa Barsoomian, RICO
"Pattern"Before and After H.J. Inc.: A Proposed Definition, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 919, 923
(1991) (describing how RICO was used sparingly prior to 1981); Bradley, supranote 10,
at 845 (noting that RICO provides law enforcement and prosecutors with enhanced
criminal penalties and remedies). See generally Blakey & Gettings, supranote 10, at 101112 (noting that RICO was virtually ignored at first by prosecutors, then ultimately
expanded beyond organized crime cases to include white collar and political corruption
prosecutions).
36. For a discussion of the disagreement between the circuit courts over whether
RICO should be applied to illegal businesses, see Blakey & Gettings, supra note 10, at
1022-28; Bradley, supra note 10, at 851-53. See also Israel, supra note 34, at 574 (noting
how certain circuit courts have sought to narrow the scope of the enterprise element
by excluding illegal enterprises).
37. 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding that a broad construction of the
term "enterprise" included illegitimate businesses, such as a gambling operation), cert.
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however, the Supreme Court stated in a footnote that RICO was
designed "to prevent the infiltration of legitimate business operations... by individuals who have
obtained investment capital from a
39
pattern of racketeering activity."
But some federal courts, citing legislative history and the broad
language of the Act, ignored the Iannelli dicta and began extending
the enterprise element to encompass illegitimate businesses or
entities.' For example, in United States v. Hawes,4 the Fifth Circuit
emphasized that the federal RICO statute on its face and its legislative
history supported an application of the Act to "enterprises which are
from their inception organized for illicit purposes. "42
As use of RICO in criminal and civil prosecutions increased in the
1980s,43 the circuit courts remained split over whether the statute's
scope extended to both legitimate and illegitimate businesses. The
debate, however, was finally resolved by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Turkette.4' The Court held that RICO applied not only to
legitimate businesses, but also to wholly illegitimate businesses.4"

denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); see also Bradley, supra note 10, at 852.
38.

420 U.S. 770 (1975).

39. Id. at 787 n.19.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1003 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(holding that RICO's enterprise element is not limited to legitimate businesses and
organizations), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880,
897-98 (5th Cir.) (holding that RICO enterprises include not only legitimate businesses,
but businesses organized for illegal activities), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United
States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976) (interpreting the use of the word "any"
in the RICO statutes to mean that Congress intended to include illegitimate
organizations), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). But see United States v. Turkette, 632
F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980) (stating that criminal enterprises are not included in RICO),
rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
41. 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting that "Congress gave the term 'enterprise'
a very broad meaning").
42. Id. at 479; see aLso United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1073 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978).
43. See Bonney, supra note 11, at 593. In the 1980s, federal prosecutors
increasingly used the statute to target enterprise criminality as more federal courts
determined that Congress had not expressly limited RICO to cases where the defendant
or enterprise was tied to organized crime. See Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Case for
RICO Refom, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 695 (1990) (noting the significant increase in
criminal and civil RICO prosecutions arose in part because of RICO's broad statutory
language and severe monetary penalties).
44. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
45. Id. at 579-81. The Turkette court expressly rejected the lower court's limited
application of RICO to solely legitimate enterprises. Id. The Court reasoned, "[h]ad
Congress not intended to reach criminal associations, it could easily have narrowed the
sweep of the definition by inserting a single word, 'legitimate.'" Id. at 581. The Court
also noted that "insulating the wholly criminal enterprise from prosecution under RICO
is the more incongruous position." Id. at 587.
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The Turkette court also discussed the essential characteristics of a
racketeering offense that must be proved to secure a RICO conviction:
the existence of an enterprise and a connected pattern of racketeering
activity. The Court explained that while the pattern of racketeering is
proved by evidence of the requisite number of racketeering acts
committed by members of the enterprise, the enterprise requires
"evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by
46
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit."
In Turkette, the Court determined that there was sufficient evidence of
an association-in-fact enterprise, even though loosely structured, based
upon the respondent's leadership of and participation in the criminal
organization.4 7
Furthermore, the Court held that the "existence of an enterprise at
all times remains a separate element which must be proved by the
Government," and thus the enterprise element is not the pattern of
racketeering activity.'
The Turkette court noted, however, that
"[w]hile the proof used to establish these separate elements may in
particular cases coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish
the other."4 9 Thus, the Court resolved the legitimate or illegitimate
issue, but created another.
Since Turkette, various tests have emerged among the federal circuit
courts to determine what characteristics an enterprise should possess,
and whether the enterprise element must be established with proof
apart from that used to demonstrate the pattern of racketeering
activity. The circuit courts particularly differ on the requisite proof
needed to establish an association-in-fact enterprise as opposed to a
legal entity such as a partnership or corporation.5" Turkette, therefore,

46.
47.
48.

Id. at 583.
Id.
Id. The alleged enterprise was comprised of a group of persons associated in

fact for the purpose of illegal trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs,
bribery, mail fraud and insurance fraud. Id. at 579. The Court noted that "[tihe
common thread to all counts was [Turkette's] alleged leadership of this criminal
organization through which he orchestrated and participated in the commission of the
various crimes delineated in the RICO count or charged in the eight preceding counts."
Id.
49. Id. at 583.
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (4) (1994) (giving definition of"enterprise"). For detailed
discussions of the tests that have developed in the federal courts of appeal defining a
RICO enterprise, see O'Neill, supra note 10, at 705-13; Bradley, supra note 10, at 851-61;
Vitter, supra note 34, at 1422-36; Donovan, supra note 34, at 564-65; Gardiner, supra
note 32, at 684-91; Ludwick, supra note 32, at 387-98; Tracy Doherty et al., Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 769, 789-96 (1994). See also
Israel, supra note 34, at 574-81 (noting that under the narrow approach taken by some
of the circuit courts, including the Eighth Circuit, repeated acts of racketeering are not
sufficient to prove a RICO enterprise separate from the pattern of racketeering activity
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has not proved to be the last word on how federal RICO is to be

interpreted.
The majority of federal appellate courts, including the Second, Fifth,
Sixth, Eleventh and District of Columbia, take an expansive approach 5 and hold that the same proof used to establish the enter-

prise can overlap with the proof used to satisfy the pattern of racketeering requirement.5 2 According to the majority view, a RICO enterprise
of an association independent of the pattern of
does not require proof
53
racketeering activity.
Support for the majority position developed out of dicta in the
Supreme Court's decision in Turkette, which noted that proof of the

if part of a single criminal scheme); Barsoomian, supra note 35, at 925-26 (describing
the Eighth Circuit's "multiple schemes" test for a racketeering pattern, under which
multiple illegal acts committed to further a single criminal scheme fail to establish a
pattern).
51. See Vitter, supra note 34, at 1424-27; Israel, supra note 34, at 184-97; O'Neill,
supra note 10, at 707-10; Gardiner, supra note 32, at 688-91.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
896, and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987); United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522
(11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1110 (1986); United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied 461 U.S. 945 (1983); United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152 (2nd
Cir. 1980), cert. denieA 453 U.S. 911 (1981).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 369 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that
the defendant along with other individuals and corporations formed an association-infact enterprise, which conspired to obtain government funds from improperly awarded
contracts and distributed the proceeds among the associates), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821
(1988). The Perholtz court distinguished between the requisite proof of an organized
criminal association and separate proof of organized criminal activity apart from that
committed by the organization. The court reasoned:
The same group of individuals who repeatedly commit predicate
offenses do not necessarily comprise an enterprise. An extra
ingredient is required: organization. To the extent, however, these
[minority view] cases suggest that the organization cannot be
inferred from the pattern (or even more, that the organization
cannot exist unless it does something other than commit predicate
acts), we cannot agree.
Id. at 363. SeealsoUnitedStates v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding
that while the enterprise and pattern of racketeering are separate and distinct elements,
the same evidence can be used to establish both elements), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098
(1986), and cet. denieA 484 U.S. 832 (1987); Weinstein, 762 F.2d at 1537 n.13 (finding
that in a case involving a conspiracy to defraud pharmaceutical manufacturers by
obtaining products through false pretenses, the enterprise need not possess a structure
distinct from that necessary to carry out the racketeering activity); United States v.
Hewes, 729 F.2d 1302, 1325 (l1th Cir. 1984) (holding that a RICO enterprise was
established where a dozen "bust out schemes" were carried out by various individuals
with little overlap, but using very similar methods of operation), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1110 (1985); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cen. denieA 439 U.S. 953
(1978).
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two elements may sometimes coalesce. 4 Further support for this
position can be found in the expansive language and liberal construction clause of the statute, as well as in RICO's legislative history."
Under the majority approach, the Second Circuit has adopted the
most expansive construction of a RICO enterprise. 6 In United States
v. Indelicato,57 the Second Circuit emphasized that while proof of two
acts of racketeering by itself is not sufficient to establish a pattern of
racketeering, "the relatedness and the continuity necessary to show a
RICO pattern may be proven through the nature of the RICO
The court reasoned, reiterating the language of
enterprise.""
Turkette, that although the government was required to prove both the
existence of an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity, the
proof could coalesce.59
The minority view, held by the Third, Fourth, Eighth and Tenth
Circuits, favors a narrow construction of the RICO statute.' These
federal courts require proof that the enterprise exist outside the course

54. Tuykette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); see also Donovan, supra note 34, at 565
(rejecting the distinctiveness requirement of the minority position, and supporting the
majority view that the government is not required to prove the existence of the
enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activity with separate evidence).
55. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 states that "the provisions of this
title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 922 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961).
56. See Vitter, supra note 34, at 1424-27.
57. 865 F.2d 1370 (2nd Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 907 (1989).
58. Id. at 1383; see also United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2nd Cir.) (explaining
how RICO can be properly applied in situations where the enterprise was essentially
nothing more than the sum of the underlying predicate racketeering acts), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 840 (1983). The court reasoned that "it is logical to characterize any
associative group in terms of what it does, rather than by abstract analysis of its
structure." Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
59. Indelicato,865 F.2d at 1384; United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2nd Cir.),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983). In Mazzei, the Second Circuit held that an associationin-fact enterprise had been proved by evidence of a common purpose, that the group
functioned as a continuing unit, and that it derived profit from illegal acts, which
constituted the pattern of racketeering. Id. at 89. The court did not require that the
enterprise be distinct from the organization needed to commit the pattern of
racketeering activity. Id. at 88. Rather, the court rejected the Eighth Circuit's
distincmess position, and noted that "[ci rime is not less organized where its purposes
are singular." Id. at 90. The court reasoned that Turkette did not "hold that proof of
these separate elements be distinct and independent, as long as the proof offered is
sufficient to satisfy both elements." Id. at 89.
60. SeeVitter, supra note 34, at 1427-30; O'Neill, supra note 10, at 708-14, 721 n.63;
Israel, supra note 34, at 582-84, 587-88; Gardiner, supra note 32, at 688-91; Donovan,
supra note 34, at 565.
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of conduct needed to commit the predicate offenses. 6'
The minority and majority views have identified several basic
characteristics that a RICO enterprise must possess. 6 Association
members must have a common or shared purpose, and the enterprise
must exhibit some degree of organizational structure and continuity
over time. But the minority view diverges from the majority position
by requiring that a third characteristic be satisfied to establish a RICO
enterprise; the enterprise must be distinct and separate from the
pattern of racketeering. 6 As one commentator noted:
About one-third of the federal circuits require, in addition to the
elements set forth in the Act itself, that the enterprise element of a
RICO claim be substantially different from the predicate acts which
constitute the pattern of racketeering activity. Whether this element
64
should be implied in the Act is often called the separateness issue.
The "distinctiveness" or "separateness" characteristic requires that
the enterprise element be established with evidence apart from that
used to prove the pattern of racketeering activity.6 Similar to the
majority view, the minority view relies on the language of Turkette that
the "existence of an enterprise remains at all times a separate element
which must be proved by the Government," as support for its position. 66
C.

The Eighth Circuit'sRICO Test for an Enterprise
Of all the circuits adopting the minority view, the Eighth Circuit has

61. See, e.g., United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Tillett, 763 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982).
62. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
63. See Vitter, supra note 34, at 1427; O'Neill, supra note 10, at 708; Israel, supra
note 34, at 569.
64. Israel, supra note 34, at 569.
65. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. The Fourth Circuit has emphasized the importance
of a developed structure, that the criminal enterprise must consist of more than what
is required to commit the underlying predicate crimes. Ti/ett, 763 F.2d at 628. In
Tillett, the government established that the criminal enterprise had operated beyond its
drug trafficking activities, including running a seafood restaurant as a smuggling front.
Id. at 632; see also United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that the
enterprise must exist "separate and apart" from the pattern of racketeering), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1156 (1982).
The Third Circuit has similarly reasoned that the third element to prove a RICO
enterprise requires establishing that the organization is an entity separate and apart
from the racketeering activity in which it is engaged. Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 223 (citing
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583).
66. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
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developed the strictest test for proving a RICO enterprise.67 The
Eighth Circuit's position was first articulated in United States v.
Anderson,68 a pre-Turkette case, in which the court stated that to secure
a RICO conviction, the government must show that an association-infact enterprise is "substantially different from the underlying predicate
offenses constituting the racketeering pattern." 69 More specifically,
the Anderson court held that:
Congress intended that the phrase "a group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity," as used in its definition of the
term "enterprise" in section 1961(4), to encompass only an association having an ascertainable structure which exists for the purpose of
maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has
an existence that can be defined apart from the commission of the
predicate acts constituting the "pattern of racketeering activity." 70

In sum, Anderson established, in the Eighth Circuit, what has become
known as the "distinctiveness" or "separateness" requirement.
Although the Eighth Circuit adopted a distinctiveness requirement
in Anderson, commentator David Vitter suggests that subsequent
decisions defined distinctiveness in a new way.71 Unlike Anderson's
emphasis that the enterprise's economic goal be defined separately
from the commission of the predicate acts, subsequent cases focus on
the requirement that there be a structured enterprise more developed
than the organization needed or inherent in the commission of the
racketeering pattern.72
In 1982, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Bledsoe" relied on the
language of Anderson as it attempted to limit RICO's use in prosecutions of associations-in-fact. 74 The Bledsoe court determined that the
characteristics of a RICO enterprise include "an 'ascertainable
structure' distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of
racketeering." 75 The court explained that "[t]his distinct structure
might be demonstrated by proof that a group engaged in a diverse

67. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
68. 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
69. Id. at 1365. This was the first time the Eighth Circuit addressed the problem
of how to define RICO's scope. Id. at 1362.
70. Id. But see National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 804
(1994) (holding that a RICO enterprise was not required to have an economic
purpose). For a discussion of the unanimous Supreme Court's decision overruling the
economic motive, see Donovan, supra note 34, at 561.
71. See Vitter, supra note 34, at 1427-29, 1434-36.
72. See supra text accompanying note 50.
73. 764 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denieA 459 U.S. 1040 (1982).
74. Id. at 665. The B/edsoe court reversed the defendant's RICO conviction, holding
that the association between the agricultural cooperatives and individual participants
did not constitute an enterprise. Id. at 667.
75. Id. at 665.
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pattern of crimes or that it has an organizational pattern or system of
authority beyond what was necessary to perpetrate the predicate
crimes. "76 The court also noted that "under RICO, an enterprise
cannot simply be the undertaking of the acts of racketeering, neither
can it be the minimal association which surrounds these acts. Any two
criminal acts will necessarily be surrounded by some degree of
organization ....

,

Thus, the Bledsoe court held that absent this

distinctiveness requirement, "the Act simply punishes the
commission
7
of two of the specified crimes within a 10-year period." 1
In a case decided later that year, however, the Eighth Circuit in
United States v. Lemm, 79 interpreted Turkette's language that the
enterprise is "an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity
in which it engages,"8" to exclude those entities that do not have a
structure separate from that needed to commit the predicate acts."
Similar to Bledsoe, the Lemm court characterized a RICO enterprise as
having a structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of the
pattern of racketeering. 2 The Lemm court, however, focused its
inquiry on the activities of an alleged arson ring."3 Since the arson
ring could have conducted its criminal activities without the underlying
predicate acts of mail fraud, the court found that the RICO enterprise
was distinct and separate.84 The test as applied in Lemm, therefore,
suggests that proof of the enterprise structure could be established by
a diverse pattern of crimes, whereas the Bledsoe court's inquiry had
focused on the structure of the alleged criminal enterprise.
Today, the Eighth Circuit's test for the existence of an "enterprise"
76. Id. To illustrate this type of structure, the B/edsoe court gave the example of the
command system of the Mafia family. Id. Another example the court provided was the

"hierarchy, planning, and division of profits in a prostitution ring." Id.
77. Id. at 664. The court found that "[a] t best, the Government has shown two
separate associations of individuals without any overarching structure or common
control." Id. at 666.
78. Id. at 664; see Vitter, supra note 34, at 1429-36 (explaining how, after Anderson,
the Eighth Circuit interpreted the distinctiveness question differently in Bledsoe and
Lemm).
79. 680 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983). In Lemm,
three defendants were convicted of conspiracy to violate RICO and of mail fraud as part
of an insurance fraud scheme that included 17 arson fires over a three-year period. Id.
at 1196. The court found that "[t]his is not an instance of a sporadic and temporary
criminal alliance to commit one of the enumerated RICO crimes." Id. at 1201.
80. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
81. Lemm, 680 F.2d at 1198.
82. Id. at 1200-01.
83. Id. at 1201.
84. Id. The court held that, "if we eliminate for purposes of argument the
predicate acts of mail fraud, the evidence still shows an ongoing structure .... Clearly,
the enterprise alleged by the government has not been impermissibly equated with the
predicate acts of racketeering." Id.
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consists of three distinct characteristics: "1) common or shared
purpose; 2) some continuity of structure and personnel; and, 3) an
ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in a pattern of
racketeering.""5 The third characteristic of this three-prong test is the
most controversial. Under this prong, the facts and evidence used to
prove a pattern of racketeering activity are not sufficient to prove a
RICO enterprise." Recently, Minnesota adopted a new test which
retained the first two Eighth Circuit requirements for a RICO
enterprise, but altered the third Eighth Circuit requirement.
D. Minnesota's RICO Test for an Enterprise
In 1989, Minnesota enacted a racketeering statute generally
87
patterned after the federal RICO statute with a few key distinctions.
One difference is that Minnesota's RICO Act excludes the word
"individual," so that one person, with the exception of a sole proprietorship, cannot constitute a criminal "enterprise" under Minnesota

85. Id. at 1198; Bledso 764 F.2d at 664; Kragness, 830 F.2d at 855.
86. Commentators and prosecutors have attacked the Eighth Circuit's distinctiveness requirement as inconsistent with Turkete. See supra note 50 and accompanying text;
see also RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR
FEDERAL PROSECUTORS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION 35-36 (1985)

(ac-

knowledging that the Eighth Circuit's efforts to restrain indiscriminate application of
RICO "is premised on a requirement that evidence establishing the enterprise's
existence must be distinct from the evidence establishing the pattern of racketeering,
[but that] it is in error, in our view").
87. Minnesota's RICO Act states:
A person is guilty of racketeering if the person: 1) is employed by
or associated with an enterprise and intentionally conducts or
participates in the affairs of the enterprise by participating in a
pattern of criminal activity; 2) acquires or maintains an interest in
or control of an enterprise, or an interest in real property, by
participating in a pattern of criminal activity;, or 3) participates in a
pattern of criminal activity and knowingly invests any proceeds
derived from the conduct, or any proceeds derived from that
investment or use of those proceeds, in an enterprise or in real
property.
MINN. STAT. § 609.903 (1994); see also interview with Michael Freeman, Hennepin
County Attorney, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar. 18, 1996) [hereinafter Freeman
Interview]. In 1989, Freeman, then a senator, introduced a bill in the Minnesota Senate
modeled after the NewYork statute with the intent to formulate a statute more narrowly
written than federal RICO. Thus, the statute also incorporates features of New York's
Organized Crime Control Act, which served as a model. Cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460
(McKinney Supp. 1987). For more information on the New York RICO statute, see

Daniel L. Feldman, Principled Comnprmise: The New York State Organized Crime Control Act,
6 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 50 (1987).

Rep. Phil Carruthers introduced a House bill, drafted by the Minnesota Attorney
General's Office, based upon the federal statute. Interview with Phil Carruthers,
Minnesota Representative, in St. Paul, Minn. (Feb. 7, 1996) [hereinafter Carruthers
Interview].
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Another difference is that the significant definitions of
law.'a
"criminal activity" and "pattern of racketeering activity" are drawn more
narrowly than the federal statute. 9 These key definitions have been
the product of case law since the early 1980s. 9' The concept of
"enterprise criminality," borrowed from the federal RICO statute, is
also significantly narrowed to concentrate on violent crimes and illegal
drug trafficking. 91
A third important difference is that Minnesota's statute requires a
pattern of racketeering activity to be established by three rather than
two predicate acts, and two of these underlying crimes must be felony
offenses, as compared with the federal RICO Act requiring only one
felony.92 Finally, Minnesota's statute excludes private RICO actions
and mandates that RICO actions be brought by either the county
attorney or the attorney general. 93

88. MINN. STAT. § 609.902, subd. 3 (1994). Section 609.902, subdivision 3 defines
a RICO enterprise as "a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust, or other
legal entity, or a union, governmental entity, association, or group of persons, associated
in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as legitimate enterprises."
Id. For a discussion about how the Minnesota courts have narrowed the scope of
RICO's enterprise element, see infra text accompanying note 142. Compare MINN. STAT.
§ 609.902, subd. 3 with 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994). See Bonney, supra note 11, at 586-87
(noting that in the wake of the Mafia's increasing influence on the U.S. marketplace,
RICO was designed as a remedial statute, to give law enforcement and prosecutors a
means to successfully combat organized crime).
89. The Minnesota statute also defines criminal activity to include only felonies.
MINN. STAT. § 609.902, subd. 4.
90. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAd: Hearings on S.F. 483 Before
the Senate Judiciary Comm., Criminal Law Division, 76th Minn. Leg., 1989-90 Reg. Sess.
The
(1989) (statement of Stephen Kilgriff, former Deputy Attorney General).
Minnesota Legislature wanted to ensure that Minnesota's RICO statute would not
contain the more controversial aspects of the federal bill, most notably private RICO
actions, and that statutory definitions be narrower than under federal RICO to avoid
too broad a statute. Id.
91. MINN. STAT. § 609.901-.903; see RacketeeringInfluenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act: Hearings on S.F 483 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., Criminal Law Division, 76th
Minn. Leg., 1989-90 Reg. Sess. (1989).
92. See MINN. STAT. § 609.902, subd. 6 (defining a pattern of racketeering activity
as three or more criminal acts committed within a 10-year period that are neither
isolated nor so closely related that they should be considered a single offense, and that
are related through a common scheme or plan or shared criminal purpose). But see 18
U.S.C. § 1961 (5) (1994) (requiring a minimum of two predicate crimes within 10
years). Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.902, subd. 5 with 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) (requiring
only one of the predicate crimes be a felony offense).
93. Minnesota Statutes § 609.902, subdivision 9 designates that the prosecuting
authority for RICO actions is "the office of a county attorney or office of the attorney
general." Members of both the House and Senate were concerned about private RICO
actions, the source of much controversy in the federal act. For a discussion of this issue,
see RacketeeringInfluenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct: Hearings on S.F. 483 Before the
SenateJudiciay Comm., CriminalLaw Division, 76th Minn. Leg., 1989-90 Reg. Sess. (1989)
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A comparison of legislative histories of the federal RICO Act and
Minnesota RICO Act reveals a somewhat different focus in each of the
statutes, although both statutes target the problem of organized
crime.94 While Congress intended that the federal statute's major
purpose be to eradicate a wide variety of illegal activity, the Minnesota
Legislature was particularly concerned about controlled substance
crime.9 5 Whereas gambling and loansharking were the largest sources
of revenue for organized crime when federal RICO was enacted,96
nearly two decades later, the Minnesota Legislature denounced street
gangs profiting from the illegal drug trade as the organized crime
threat of the 1980s and 1990s.97
Minnesota Rep. Phil Carruthers, who introduced the House RICO
bill, described the importance of targeting the threat posed by street
gangs engaged in drug trafficking and sales. Mr. Carruthers stated:
This bill is an attempt to go after the drug syndicates and the drug
gangs that have become so much of a threat to public safety in our
state and other states. We're seeing, of course, the Vice Lords, the
Bloods and the Crips. They're moving in here. . . . This bill
attempts to take away those illegal profits and take away those illegal
gains from the drug pushers and from the drug organizations."

Hennepin County Attorney Michael Freeman, then senator, sponsored
the Senate bill.99 He also intended that the bill concentrate on drug-

and Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct: Hearings on H.F. 837 Before the
House Judiciary Comm., CriminalJustice Division, 76th Minn. Leg., 1989-90 Reg. Sess.
(1989).

94. Compare Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
84 Stat. 922 (1970) with Preface of Minn. Chapter 286, H.F. No. 837, 76th Minn. Leg.,
1989-90 Reg. Sess. (1989). Like the federal RICO statute, heightened penalties can also
be imposed under Minnesota's RICO Act. These criminal penalties include prison
terms of up to 20 years, fines up to one million dollars, criminal forfeiture after
conviction, injunctive relief, restitution and an alternate fine amounting to three times
the loss caused or the illegal profits gained. MINN. STAT. § 609.904, subds. 1-5.
95. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct: Hearings on H.F. 837 Before
the House JudiciaryComm., CriminalJustice Division, 76th Minn. Leg., 1989-90 Reg. Sess.
(1989); Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct: Hearingson S.F. 483 Before the
SnateJudiciayComm., CriminalLawDivision,76th Minn. Leg., 1989-90 Reg. Sess. (1989).
96. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 2-3. For information about RICO's
legislative history, see Blakey & Gettings, supra note 10, at 1014-21; Bradley, supra note
10, at 838-45.
97. For further discussion of the issues surrounding the creation of Minnesota's
RICO statute, see sources cited supra note 95.
98. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct: Hearings on H.F. 837 Before
the HouseJudiciary Comm., CriminalJustice Division, 76th Minn. Leg., 1989-90 Reg. Sess.
(1989).
99. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct: Hearingson S.F. 483 Before
the SenateJudiciary Comm., Criminal Law Division, 76th Minn. Leg., 1989-90 Reg. Sess.
(1989).
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related crimes, while acknowledging its effectiveness against other
illegal activity."°° Mr. Freeman stated:
This [RICO] is really to be used against drug gangs and the scope is
now limited because of that. It seems at least to my understanding
of the Minnesota crime problem, that's our biggest problem ....
Now RICO can be used very effectively in terms of obscenity, and
prostitution, and other areas. But it seems that we need the
01
prosecutorial resources and we ought to focus on our chief area.
Although there were some differences, both the Minnesota House and
Senate focused on gang activity, particularly gang involvement in drug
dealing and money laundering, in formulating Minnesota's RICO
statute.
Minnesota's RICO Act, similar to its federal counterpart, was
intended to be broadly construed and not limited to drug-related
offenses or even to traditional organized crime.102 Minnesota's
statute contains an express provision that it "shall be liberally construed
to achieve [its] remedial purposes of curtailing racketeering activity
and controlled substance crime .. . "103 This broad interpretation
follows the lead of the United States Supreme Court which has
adopted a literal and expansive reading of the federal statute."° It
is not apparent, however, that the Minnesota Supreme Court has
adopted a broad test to determine the existence of an "enterprise" in
the RICO statute.
Minnesota recently adopted the Eighth Circuit's distinctive three-part
test for determining the existence of a RICO enterprise in State v.
Huynh.105 The Huynh court held that to establish a RICO enterprise
the state must prove the following three elements: (1) a common or
shared enterprise among the individuals associated with the enterprise;
(2) an ongoing organization with some continuity of structure and
personnel; and (3) an ascertainable structure distinct from that

100. Id.
101. RacketeeringInfluenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct: Hearings on S.F. 483 Before
the Senate Judicay Comm., Criminal Law Division, 76th Minn. Leg., 1989-90 Reg. Sess.
(1989).

102. RICO was enacted to attack "enterprise criminality". See Blakey & Gettings,
supra note 10, at 1013-14 (explaining that RICO should not be limited in use to the

Mafia or traditional organized crime, because "organized crime" has other meanings).
103. MINN. STAT. § 609.901 (1994); see also MINN. STAT. §§ 609.902-.912.

104. See Israel, supra note 34, at 589-92 (describing the Supreme Court's broad
interpretation of RICO given the pattern of holdings in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479 (1985)). The Supreme Court in Sedima stated, "RICO is to be read
broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress' self-consciously expansive language
and overall approach, but also of its express admonition that RICO is to be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497-98 (quoting Pub.
L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970)) (citations omitted).
105. 519 N.W.2d 191 (Minn. 1994).
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inherent in the racketeering activity.1"' The supreme court, however,
modified the third prong by focusing more on the activities of the
organization than the structure0 7of the organization as did the Eighth
Circuit in Bledsoe and Kragness.1
In Huynh, a case of first impression according to the dissent, the
supreme court considered whether the defendant, a member of an
Asian gang, had engaged in racketeering.108 Defendant Huynh and
his associates extorted money from a restaurateur, threatening to kill
the owner and his family if he failed to pay $1,500 in monthly
protection money.1°
A jury convicted 10 Huynh of five counts of
coercion and one count of racketeering.
The supreme court held that Huynh and the associates with whom
he extorted money constituted an "association-in-fact" enterprise.'
The court found that the three prongs of the Eighth Circuit's test for
an enterprise were met.112 The first prong was met since the gang
had a common purpose of extortion.1 ' The second prong was
satisfied because the organization and its criminal activity continued
over a period of time. 1 4 The supreme court, however, modified the
third prong to focus on whether the activities of Huynh and his
associates extended beyond the commission of the underlying
extortion crimes, as opposed to merely seeking evidence of a pattern
of authority or infra-structure of the organization. 1
The majority
in Huynh, therefore, concluded that the group's money laundering
activities were sufficient proof that the organization had an existence
beyond that required to commit the predicate offenses, 16 and thus
affirmed the racketeering conviction."

106. Id. at 196 (citing Diamonds Plus, Inc. v. Kolber, 960 F.2d 765, 770 (8th Cir.
1992); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 855 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982)).
107. Id. at 197-98.
108. Id. at 192.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 193.
111. Id. at 197.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 196. The third prong requires the following: "the activities of the
organization extend beyond the commission of the underlying criminal acts to

coordinate the underlying criminal acts into a pattern of criminal activity or to engage
in other activities." Id.
116. Id. at 197.
117. Id.at 196 n.7, 198. (explaining that the new prong of the test for an enterprise
under Minnesota RICO's Act derives from Diamonds Plus, Inc. v. Kolber, 960 F.2d 765,
770 (8th Cir. 1992)). The Eighth Circuit's distinct structure inquiry focused on
"whether the enterprise encompasses more than what is necessary to commit the
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The dissent in Huynh, however, criticized the majority's new version

of the Eighth Circuit's test for its shift in focus from the organizational
structure of the enterprise to the activities engaged in by the enterprise."' This shift, the minority argued, collapsed the requirements
for the enterprise and pattern of racketeering together 9 According
to the dissent, "the majority would require the state to prove that 'the
activities of the organization extend beyond the commission of the
underlying criminal acts either to coordinate the underlying criminal
acts into a pattern of criminal activity or to engage in other activities. "120
The dissent concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish
an enterprise under the third prong because the activities used to
prove the enterprise were those that constituted the pattern of
racketeering activity.12 ' Thus, the dissent found "[t]he existence of
'money laundering' does not provide the proof of a separate entity... [because] appellant had to negotiate the checks and money
orders in some fashion to have access to the fruits of his crime. Nor
was any evidence introduced that an organization coordinated
appellant's acts of extortion." 122 Although the dissent agreed with
the majority that Minnesota courts should look to the federal courts'
interpretations of RICO law when interpreting Minnesota's RICO Act,
the dissent would apply the Eighth Circuit's enterprise test without
1 23
modification.
In sum, given the various tests developed by the circuit courts, there
remains a critical difference between the majority and the minority
positions: the degree of separateness required to establish the
enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activity as distinct elements. 12 4
Moreover, in Huynh, the Minnesota Supreme Court
modified the Eighth Circuit's test in an effort to further narrow the
definition of what constitutes a RICO enterprise. The same day that
the court set out its new test for an enterprise in Huynh, it applied the

predicate RICO offense." Id.
118. Id. at 198-99 (Gardebring,J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 199-200 n.1.
120. Id. at 199 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 200-01 (noting that while there may have been an Asian gang behind the
appellant's extortion activities, the state failed to prove this).
122. Id. at 201.
123. Id. Justice Gardebring stated, "I agree with the majority that this statute was
meant only to apply to organized crime, but I would apply the Kragness test without the
court's modifications." Id.
124. The separateness requirement is faced by the prosecutor in the pleadings. As
one commentator noted, "an association-in-fact is what the pleader makes it, so long as
the Turkaete requirements are met." O'Neill, supra note 10, at 664.
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test in the companion case State v. Kelly.1 '
III.

THE KELLY DECISION

The Kelly Facts
From July 1989 through February 1991, Gary Allen Kelly worked as
a pimp in prostitution activities which took place in Minneapolis and
Chicago. 2 He solicited teen-age girls to work as prostitutes, recruiting them with promises of money and gifts, and then kept the girls'
abused
prostitution money. 7 Kelly also threatened and 1physically
28
at least one of the girls to prevent her from leaving.
On April 2, 1992, a jury found Kelly guilty of one count of soliciting
prostitution, five counts of promoting prostitution, five counts of
receiving profits derived from prostitution, and one count of racketeering. " The court of appeals applied the Eighth Circuit's RICO test,
but also suggested, as Turkette had, that proof of a RICO enterprise and
pattern of racketeering may coalesce.'30 The appellate court affirmed the conviction, stating that Kelly's promises of gifts and money,
deception, threats, and violence used to maintain his organization
what was necessary to
demonstrated that an enterprise existed beyond
3
commit the predicate prostitution offenses.'1
A.

The Minnesota Supreme Court's Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court accepted review to determine what
is required to establish the existence of a RICO enterprise under
B.

125.

519 N.W.2d 202 (1994).

126. State v. Kelly, 504 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 519 N.W.2d
202 (1994). Kelly recruited eight runaway girls to prostitute for him and fellow pimps
Herman Gordon, and Ronnie Nelson. Id. at 516-17. Testimony by the juvenile prostitutes indicated that Kelly was most active in directing the prostitution efforts. Id. at 51618. Kelly worked from customer lists, taking the girls to motels and apartments in the
Twin Cities to perform prostitution acts. Id. He and codefendant Nelson also brought
several juveniles to Chicago, where Kelly took the girls to apartment complexes to have
sex with waiting customers. Id. at 516.
127. Id. Kelly pocketed all prostitution money, except for some money he allowed
a prostitute whom he dated to keep. Id. at 517.
128. Id. (noting that Kelly became enraged and hit one of the teen-age prostitutes
when she tried to run away).
129. Id. at 513.
130. Id. at 518. But see Brief for Respondent at 23, State v. Kelly, 509 N.W.2d 202
(Minn. 1994) (criticizing the Minnesota Court of Appeals' suggestion that the state
"must prove inter alia the existence of an organizational pattern or system of authority
beyond that necessary to perpetrate the predicate crimes").
131. Kelly, 504 N.W.2d at 519.
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Minnesota's RICO test.3 2 The Kely court noted that a lone individual, unless operating as a sole proprietorship, cannot constitute a RICO
"enterprise" under Minnesota's statute. 133
The supreme court,
reversing the racketeering conviction, determined that there was no
"association-in-fact" between Kelly and the juvenile prostitutes.TM
The Kel/y court applied the Eighth Circuit's narrow definition and
test for a RICO enterprise, which was adopted and modified in Huynh
the very same day. 13 5 The supreme court held that the first requirement of a common purpose was met because Kelly and the juveniles
were engaged in the business of prostitution.3 6 The court determined that the second prong, which requires some degree of

132. See State v. Kelly, 519 N.W.2d 202 (Minn. 1994) (applying a new version of the
Bledsoe and Kragnesstest). Twojustices concurred in the result reached by the majority,
but dissented in part, arguing for the test applied in Kragness. Id. at 205-06
(Gardebring, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
133. Kelly, 519 N.W.2d at 204 n.5. The Senate Judiciary Committee omitted the
word "individual" from Minnesota's RICO statute. See RacketeeringInfluenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act: Hearings on S.F. 483, Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., CriminalLaw
Division, 76th Minn. Leg., 1989-90 Reg. Sess. (1989).
134. Kely, 519 N.W.2d at 205 (noting that Kelly's requirement and transportation
of prostitutes, his black book of customers and pocketing fees, did not prove a criminal
association). See Brief for Appellant at 44-46, State v. Kelly, 504 N.W.2d 513 (Minn. CL
discretion in sentencing
App. 1993) (arguing on appeal that the trial court abused its
Kelly). The court assigned a severity level VIII to the offense, which is not enumerated
in the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Id.; see also MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMM'N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 4 (Aug. 1,

1995). Comment II.A.05 permits judges to exercise their discretion by assigning
offenses excluded from the Offense Severity Level Table, to a severity level they believe
appropriate. Id.

Another issue the Kelly court considered was whether characterizing Kelly's conduct
as racketeering would unfairly enhance the punishment already imposed for the same
crimes. Kelly, 519 N.W.2d at 205. The court concluded that Kelly would be twice
punished if the RICO penalties were added on to the traditional criminal penalties.
Kely, 519 N.W.2d at 205. However, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Grayson, 795 F.2d, 278, 283 (3rd. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987), that a
RICO offense and the underlying predicate crimes are not the same under a double
jeopardy analysis, so that successive prosecutions are not barred by double jeopardy.
See generally Anne Bowen Poulin, Double JeopardyProtection Against Successive Prosecutions
in Complex Criminal Cases: A Model, 25 CONN. L. REv. 95 (1992) (giving a detailed
analysis of the double jeopardy issues raised by RICO).
135. Kelly, 519 N.W.2d at 204-05. The supreme court required separate proof of the
enterprise and pattern elements in order to find a RICO violation. Id. at 205. Justices
Gardebring and Wahl dissented, arguing the Kragness test should have been applied as
discussed in their Huynh dissent. Id. at 205-06 (citing State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191,
199 (Minn. 1994)). The Huynh dissent suggested that the third prong of the majority's
test be replaced by the Kragness test, requiring an ascertainable structure distinct from

the entity needed to conduct a pattern of racketeering activity. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at
199-200.
136. Kelly, 519 N.W.2d at 205.
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continuity and structure, was likely not met because of the turnover in
the juveniles employed by Kelly." 7 Finally, the court found that the
third requirement for an enterprise was definitely not met.' s
The supreme court found that the third requirement for an
enterprise was not satisfied because there was no proof that a
prostitution enterprise existed beyond that necessary to perpetrate the
prostitution-related crimes. 9 Whereas the appellate court determined a distinct structure was proved by Kelly's promises, deception,
threats, violence and his client lists,"4° the supreme court found that
these activities were insufficient proof of a prostitution enterprise
separate from the underlying predicate offenses, Kelly's prostitution
activities."4 The majority also set forth policy concerns in support
of its narrow construction of a RICO enterprise. 4 1 In sum, the Kelly
court was particularly troubled that a broad interpretation of a RICO
enterprise could result
in racketeering offenses being imposed on
143

small-time criminals.

Justices Gardebring and Wahl, however, disagreed with the majority's
formulation of the test for the existence of an enterprise.'" Justice
Gardebring, cross-referencing her dissent in Huynh, criticized the
majority for focusing on an organization's activities rather than
requiring proof of a structural framework.'

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. State v. Kelly, 504 N.W.2d 513, 519 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
141. Kelly, 519 N.W.2d at 205 (noting that "[t]here was no coordination of the
predicate criminal acts into a 'pattern,' such as by organizing a house of prostitution
or a prostitution ring or network").
142. Id.; see also State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191, 194 (Minn. 1994). In Huynh, the
supreme court detailed its public policy considerations for narrowing the scope of
Minnesota's RICO Act. Id. at 194-95. The Huynh court found that if a minimal
cooperative effort is all that is required to prove the existence of a criminal enterprise,
Minnesota RICO collapses into a recidivist statute. Id. at 195. Thus, the court reasoned
that "[t]o avoid this collapse, we think there must be some requirement focusing the
statute on 'organized crime' and excluding ordinary, run-of-the-mill criminal activity."
Id.
143. See Kelly, 519 N.W.2d at 205 (noting that a "lone individual (unless operating
as a sole proprietorship) cannot be an enterprise for purposes of RICO").
144. Id. at 205-06 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (citing Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 198-201). Justice Gardebring criticized the
majority's disregard of the third prong of the Eighth Circuit's test for establishing a
RICO enterprise. Id. at 205. In the companion case, Justice Gardebring noted the
majority departed from the test used in Kragnessby failing to require "an ascertainable
structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering
activity." State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191, 199 (Minn. 1994) (citing United States v.
Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 855 (8th Cir. 1987)). In Huynh, Justice Gardebring questioned
the majority's reasoning, noting "[h]ad the court asked what 'ascertainable structure'
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IV ANALYSIS OF THE KILLY DECISION
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly found that Kelly's pimping
activities did not constitute a RICO enterprise based upon the Eighth
Circuit's three-step analysis as modified by Huynh. The Ke/ay court
adhered to the precedent set by the Eighth Circuit in determining that
a RICO enterprise is a separate element apart from the pattern of
racketeering activity.'
The Huynh and Kelly courts retained the first two prongs of the
Eighth Circuit's test for determining the existence of an enterprise: (1)
a common purpose among the individuals associated with the
enterprise; where (2) the organization is ongoing and continuous, with
its members functioning under some sort of decision-making arrangement or structure.1 ' The Huynh court, however, intending to clarify
the requirement of an "ascertainable structure," rewrote the third
prong.14 In effect, Minnesota now has a new test to determine the
existence of a RICO enterprise.149 In Kelly, the supreme court held
that this third requirement had not been met.'
the state had proven, the answer would have been very difficult to find. Even the
majority acknowledges that this is a case 'where it [was] difficult to get evidence of the
organizational framework of the criminal enterprise.'" Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 200.
146. Kelly, 519 N.W.2d at 205; see Vitter, supra note 34, at 1427-29, 1434-44
(discussing the Eighth Circuit's approach to the enterprise element of RICO); Ludwick,
supra note 32, at 393-96 (discussing the Eighth Circuit's requirement that enterprise be
separate from the pattern of activity). The Eighth Circuit has been critical of efforts to
expand RICO's scope. In a series of decisions, beginning with Bledsoe, the Eighth
Circuit has required proof that an enterprise have some structure separate from that
needed to conduct the pattern of racketeering activity. United States v. Bledsoe, 674
F.2d 647, 651 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982); see also Barsoomian, supra
note 35, at 925-26.
The Eighth Circuit's support for a narrow construction of the enterprise and
pattern elements pre-dates the Turkette decision. In United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d
1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981), the court held that a RICO
enterprise must be an association substantially different from the acts which form the
pattern of racketeering activity Id. at 1372. The Anderson court was concerned that a
broad interpretation of section 1962 (c) would unfairly result in persons being
prosecuted under RICO merely for engaging in prohibited conduct on two separate
occasions. Id.; see supra part II.C.
147. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 196; Kely, 519 N.W.2d at 204-05. In addition to the
turnover among the juvenile prostitutes, the Kely court was somewhat troubled by an
alleged enterprise consisting of a pimp and his teenage prostitutes. Kely, 519 N.W.2d
at 205. The court noted that the prostitutes "were, in a sense, victims," because the
defendant had kept all of the profits. Id.
148. By redefining the third prong, the court believed its resulting formulation of
a RICO enterprise to be "simple and functional." See Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 196 n.7.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 107, 115, 117.
150. Kelly, 519 N.W.2d at 205. The supreme court focused mostly upon the proof
lacking for the third element of the Eighth Circuit's test requiring an ascertainable
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The third requirement was not met since Kelly's solicitation and
profits were inherent in the underlying prostitution crimes, and
therefore the court concluded that these activities failed to constitute
a RICO enterprise."5 This holding, however, is inconsistent with the
language of Turkette and with the majority of federal circuits which
have held that separate proof is not required to establish the enterprise
and pattern of racketeering elements.' 5
From a public policy standpoint, the Kelly court properly recognized
the need to construe Minnesota's RICO Act in a way to avoid punishing ad hoc criminals. 153 The court explained the resulting public
policy ramifications if RICO is liberally construed to apply to all
individuals who commit a series of predicate crimes."s The Kelly
court reflected upon the concern in Huynh that RICO not be
construed to include persons who loosely associate with others to
commit sporadic crimes.'
This public policy concern is consistent
with legislative intent which states that the statute is not to merely
create an enhanced punishment statute, even though the statute's
language is meant to be broadly interpreted. 156 Thus, the supreme
court is attempting to address this concern, albeit incorrectly, with a
narrow construction of the "enterprise" requirement. In effect,
however, this restricts RICO's application to more sophisticated and
"organized" criminal associations.
As a result, the supreme court has altered the focus of the third
characteristic of a RICO enterprise in an effort to constrain the
inappropriate use of RICO against loosely-structured criminal
organizations. Prior to the Huynh decision, however, the third prong

structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering. Id.
151. Id. at 204-05.
152. Tuette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); See, e.g., Diamonds Plus, Inc. v. Kolber, 960
F.2d 765, 770 (8th Cir. 1992) rev'd in part on other grounds, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.
(enbanc) (noting that the facts used to support the predicate offenses may be
considered when conducting an inquiry into whether the enterprise encompasses more
than is necessary to commit the RICO crimes). But see Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361,
1364 (8th Cir.) (noting that a RICO enterprise must be proved by facts other than those
used to prove the predicate acts of racketeering), cert. denie, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
153. See Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191, 196 (Minn. 1994) (noting that without application
of BLedsoe's "distinct structure" requirement, Minnesota's RICO Act might be applied to
catch unorganized criminals and, to this end, "isolated, sporadic criminal acts" are
excluded under Minnesota's RICO Act).
154. Kelly, 519 N.W.2d at 205; Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 196.
155. Kelly, 519 N.W.2d at 205; see also Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 194-96.
156. See infra note 160. The court found that Kelly individually induced girls to
work for him as prostitutes in order to support his drug habit. Kelly, 519 N.W.2d at 205.
As such, RICO was not appropriate for such individual criminal behavior. Rather,
"Kelly has been found guilty and is being punished." Id.; see also Huynk, 519 N.W.2d at
196.
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of establishing a RICO enterprise required "an ascertainable structure
distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering
activity."157 Today, after Huynh and Kelly, the focus of this prong
concentrates on the activities, as opposed to the structure, of an
organization.5 8 By focusing on the activities of an organization, the
requirements for the distinct elements of an enterprise and the
racketeering pattern may begin to collapse." 9
The Kelly court should have rejected the Eighth Circuit's test as
inconsistent with Minnesota legislative intent and Minnesota RICO's
broad definition of an enterprise."
The Eighth Circuit's position
contradicts the Supreme Court's language in Turkette by requiring
separate proof to establish the enterprise and pattern of racketeering
elements. Although these elements are separate and distinct, the
Supreme Court expressly noted in Turkette that proofmay coalesce. The
Huynh court, however, modified the Eighth Circuit's test by characterizing the enterprise more in terms of the activities in which it is
engaged, and less in terms of the structure and organization of the
enterprise. It is this characterization of a RICO enterprise that could
prove contrary to the directives in the state and federal statutes that
RICO be broadly construed.161
There are several inherent dangers that arise when the focus shifts
to an organization's activities. The first danger is that an activities test
may preclude the prosecution of structured criminal organizations that
have a singular criminal purpose.' 62 Minnesota prosecutors say the
new test will be difficult to satisfy if the court requires proof of a highly

157. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 194, 199 (Gardebring,J., dissenting). The Huynh court
derived its test for a RICO enterprise from United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 855
(8th Cir. 1987) and United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 664 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1040 (1982). See supra part II.C.
158. The dissent criticized this focus as a departure from the Kragness test. Huynh,
519 N.W.2d at 199. The dissent found the majority's new test "contradicts the Supreme
Court's directive that the enterprise is an entity separate and apart from the activity in
which it engages." Id. at 200 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1975)).
159. See id.
160. See MINN. STAT. § 609.901 (1994) (providing that "Sections 609.902 to 609.912
shall be liberally construed to achieve their remedial purposes of curtailing racketeering
activity and controlled substances crime and lessening their economic and political
power in Minnesota"). However, the U.S. Supreme Court recently noted in Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993), that the liberal construction provision "is not an
invitation to apply RICO to new purposes that Congress never intended." Id. at 170-71.
161. The Crime Control Act of 1970 states that "[t]he provisions of this title shall
be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Sat. 922 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961).
162. Ludwick, supra note 32, at 395 (citing Vitter, supra note 34, at 1434-36).
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structured organization with a well-defined chain of authority."6
Such evidence typically is available only if an informant assists
prosecutors and police, or the police successfully infiltrate an
organization using an undercover officer."6 Moreover, if the supreme court requires separate proof for the enterprise and pattern
elements, certain kinds of prosecutions clearly envisioned by RICO's
sponsors would be excluded. For example, if a gang is involved
exclusively in gun trafficking, the evidence required to prove the
enterprise and the predicate acts would coalesce, and thus the gang
likely could not be prosecuted under Minnesota's RICO.
A second danger is the inherent uncertainty of Minnesota's new
enterprise test, since it fails to sufficiently define a RICO enterprise
and its requisite proof. What is certain is that the supreme court will
construe Minnesota's RICO Act as narrowly as needed to prevent the
statute from being used to merely target repeat criminals or enhance
penalties for group crime. What is not clear, however, is whether the
new test is a weaker version of the Eighth Circuit's test, as the dissent
claims, or whether it mandates a higher standard of proof.'6 5 What
degree of separation will the Minnesota courts require? As one
prosecutor in Huynh noted,
If the new test requires proving the enterprise by proving the
criminal activities are beyond what was needed to commit the
underlying predicate offenses, then it is not too tough a standard of
proof. It would be a test that separates out the sporadic crime from
organized crime.

But if the new test means that the court will

require proof of an organizational command and control, or
evidence of the lines of authority, RICO prosecution will be
problematic." 6

A third danger is the potential for abuse of prosecutorial discretion.
If a diversity of crimes exists, prosecutors could charge some as
predicate crimes and use the other crimes to establish the enterprise
as distinct from the pattern of criminal activity. 67 For example, a
series of drug sales could be charged as a RICO violation and as

163. Freeman Interview, supra note 87; interview with Paul Scoggin, Assistant
Hennepin CountyAttorney, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar. 18,1996) [hereinafter Scoggin
Interview]; interview with Susan Gaermer, Ramsey County Attorney, in St. Paul, Minn.
(Mar. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Gaermer Interview].
164. Freeman Interview, supra note 87; Scoggin Interview, supra note 163; Gaermer
Interview, supra note 163.
165. MINN. STAT. § 609.902, subd. 3.
166. Scoggin Interview, supra note 163.
167. Vitter, supra note 34, at 1436; see also Ludwick, supra note 32, at 415-18
(describing how prosecutorial discretion and RICO's breadth should be limited by the
courts and Congress restricting the scope of enterprise and developing a working
definition of organized crime).
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criminal violations such as concealing criminal proceeds or aiding an
offender, which would differentiate acts in furtherance of the RICO
scheme from elements of any underlying offense.
A final danger which may arise by focusing on an organization's
activities as compared to its structure is that there may be inconsistencies resulting when one court considers a series of criminal acts to be
related, while another court finds the same series to be unrelated. For
example, the supreme court in Huynh held that the defendant's money
laundering activities were not related to his predicate extortion
crimes. 16 The court, therefore, was able to find a separate and
distinct enterprise and pattern of criminal activity. 169 In Kelly,
however, the court found that the defendant's threats, violence, and
promises of gifts and money were inherent in the underlying prostitution crimes. 70 Therefore, there was no enterprise distinct from the
predicate crimes. In sum, these problems associated with the new
enterprise test suggest that Minnesota should adopt a different test.
The Minnesota Supreme Court should not have applied the Eighth
Circuit's test as modified by Huynh in Kelly. Rather, the court should
have applied the test used by the majority of federal circuits, since 7it
does not have the distinctiveness or separateness requirement.1 1
With such a test, the facts used to support the predicate offenses may
coincide with those used to prove the existence of the enterprise. The
majority's test, by allowing the evidence to coalesce, allows RICO to be
more broadly applied.
Using the majority's approach, RICO statutes can be applied more
successfully to a new type of criminal organization that poses an
economic and social threat throughout the country-street gangs. 7
Neither Congress nor the Minnesota Legislature intended the scope of

168.
169.
170.
171.

State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191, 197 (Minn. 1994).
Id.
State v. Kelly, 519 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Minn. 1994).
For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's three-part analysis, see supra text

accompanying note 85.
172. See Bonney, supra note 11, at 606. Although arguably less sophisticated and
more loosely organized than traditional organized crime syndicates, gangs have evolved
into "criminal entities that have hierarchical management structures and use violence
and bribery to evade prosecution." Id.; see, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1379
(7th Cir. 1992). The Burdett court reasoned that
The statute is aimed not only at formal enterprises such as corporations, labor unions, and government departments controlled by
racketeers (in the special sense that the statute gives this term) but
also at criminal gangs, which have a less formal, a less reticulated
and differentiated structure. There must be some structure, to
distinguish an enterprise from a mere conspiracy, but there need
not be much.
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the RICO statutes to apply solely to traditional organized crime. 75
Although the federal and state RICO statutes were originally intended
to fight the economic effects of organized crime, over time RICO has
been extended to include patterns of criminal activity by persons
outside the traditional organized crime framework.' 74
In the past decade, the RICO statute has been used successfully to
prosecute a variety of gangs,' 75 since street gangs fit within RICO's
requisite characteristics. 176 For example, gang members join for a
common purpose, usually to gain social and economic power through
173. The federal circuit courts have extended RICO beyond organized crime. See
Ruth E. Greenfield, Business Lawp-Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)--Maintenanceof a Private Civil RICO Action Does Not Require a Showing That the
Defendant Has Been Criminally Convicted of the PredicateActs Nor That the Plaintiff Has
Sustained a "RacketeeringInjury" Distinctfrom the Alleged PredicateActs, 17 ST. MARY'S LJ.
465, 468 (1986).
The language of Minnesota RICO also does not limit application to traditional
organized crime, but rather encourages a broad interpretation. See MINN. STAT.
§ 609.901. The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged Minnesota RICO's broader
applications in Huynh, stating that "clearly our statute is not limited to drug 'kingpins'
or major crime syndicates ..... Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 195.
174. See Bonney, supra note 11, at 606. RICO has not been limited in application
to traditional organized crime. The federal statute has been used to prosecute a variety
of criminal enterprises and organizations including street gangs, prison gangs and
motorcycle clubs, as well as conspiracies between individuals including lawyers and
police officers, and certified public accountants. See, e.g., United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d
1420 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a Texas prison gang constituted a RICO enterprise),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 963 (1996); United States v. Weiner, 3 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993)
(RICO conspiracy involving bank official's association with loansharking operation);
Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing enterprise consisting of
investment advisor and three associates); United States v. Williams-Davis, 821 F. Supp.
727 (D.D.C. 1993) (discussing street gang's drug trafficking conspiracy in Washington,
D.C.).
In another new use of RICO, Texas recently filed suit in federal court against the
tobacco industry, basing its claims in part on federal racketeering, conspiracy, wire and
mal fraud statutes. See BarnabyJ. Feder, Texas Files Suit on Smoking, Using Racketeering
Statute, N.Y. TImS, Mar. 29, 1996, at A9; United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667 (2nd Cir.
1987) (New York City juvenile gang), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1035 (1988).
175. See United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
members of a gang in New York City were participants in a RICO enterprise, which was
engaged in loansharking, extortion, drug dealing and murder), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941
(1992). In determining whether a RICO enterprise existed, the court said that an
association-in-fact is often more readily proven by what it does, rather than by abstract
analysis of its structure. Id. at 1559.
176. Bonney, supra note 11, at 592-93. Urban street gangs resemble traditional
organized crime organizations based on the following characteristics: continuity of
operations over an extended time period; .a hierarchical management structure;
common purpose for which members join the organization; continued criminal activity
as an important source of income; violence and threats of violence as a means of
maintaining control; and a motivation to increase influence in the community in order
to obtain more power and profits. Id.
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criminal activity,177 and gangs have a hierarchical structure that
maintains sufficient continuity to exert an ongoing community
influence.17 Furthermore, prosecutors have successfully fit a gang's
organizational structure and its activities into the definitions of a RICO
enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity.' 79
The prosecution can establish that a gang is an enterprise by
focusing on the gang's organizational structure, its common business
purpose, its profit motivation, and its reliance on criminal activity to

177. Bonney, supra note 11, at 603. The criminal activities of an urban street gang
and its recognized existence as part of the criminal underworld give the gang a level
of power and influence in the community. Patterned after federal RICO, a number of
states have passed criminal statutes making participation in the activities of a criminal
street gang a prosecutable offense. For a discussion of the various state statutes
addressing criminal street gangs, see David R. Truman, Note, The Jets and Sharks Are
Dead: State Statutoy Responses to CriminalStreet Gangs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 683 (1995). One
commentator noted that RICO's liberal construction clause and its expansive definition
of a pattern of racketeering make it an effective tool to use against street or prison
gangs. Robert A. Destro, Essay, The Hostages in the 'Hood, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 785, 800
(1994). The final provision of RICO's definition of pattern of racketeering activity,
which includes those state crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,
"is particularly sweeping because of the sheer number of crimes which fit this
description." Id.
178. For a discussion of similarities between the structure of organized crime and
street gangs, see Bonney, supranote 11, at 600-04. The management hierarchy of urban
street gangs, similar to organized crime organizations like the Mafia, is often based
upon the type of activities in which the gang is engaged. Id. Established street gangs
are characterized by strong leadership at the top of the organization and loyalty from
the gang's membership. Id. at 600. Violence and threats are used not only to protect
the gang's position and criminal activities in the community, but also by leaders to
maintain control over members. Id.
179. In United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347 (2nd Cir. 1994), cet. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1968, and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2568, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 190 (1995), gang
members were convicted of a variety of racketeering offenses including murder,
kidnapping, assault, extortion, and conspiracy. Id. at 1355. Gang members extorted
protection money from local Chinese businesses, committed robberies, and kidnapped
and murdered rival gang members for status, as well as potential wimesses and business
owners who refused to pay protection money. Id. The appellate court found there was
sufficient evidence to establish a criminal enterprise and pattern of racketeering, and
noted that crimes committed by several of the defendants as juveniles could constitute
RICO predicate acts. Id. at 1355-56.
An example of other types of organized gangs that prosecutors have targeted using
RICO is illustrated in United States v. Killip, 819 F.2d 1542 (10th Cir.), cerm.
denied, 484
U.S. 865, and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 987 (1987), where the court held that the
government established that the defendants, as past or present members of the
Oklahoma City chapter of the Outlaws Motorcycle Club, were associated with a RICO

enterprise. Id. at 1550-51. The club members engaged in the affairs of the enterprise
through a pattern of criminal activity that included drug trafficking and sales and attempted arson. Id. at 1544; ; see generally Bonney, supra note 11, at 604.
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generate money to help finance the enterprise. ' ° The pattern of
racketeering element is then satisfied by proving that the predicate
crimes were committed through the operation of the gang enterprise.s Proving a pattern of racketeering activity should not be a
significant hurdle considering that the primary business for many street
gangs is drug dealing. The federal and Minnesota RICO Acts expressly
prohibit the manufacture, importation, receiving, buying, selling or
dealing of narcotic or other dangerous drugs.18 2 As such, prosecutors should also successfully prove the racketeering element when
prosecuting gangs.
The Second Circuit, in particular, has handled a large number of
In
appeals involving gang prosecutions under federal RICO.'
United States v. Coonan,"' the court held that there was ample evi-

dence establishing that the Westies, a gang controlling criminal activity
in Manhattan, was a criminal enterprise. The Westies gang was
engaged in drug trafficking and drug sales, loansharking, and
extortion. 1" The gang's power increased when it began working
with the Gambino Organized Crime Family.18 6 As required in
Turkette, the court found that the gang's power structure endured and
that its members functioned as a unit.' 87 The court also noted that

180. For a discussion of how the government can prove that an urban or only urban
gang is a criminal enterprise, see Bonney, supra note 11, at 607-11.
181. See Bonney, supra note 11, at 611. Bonney opined that:
[O]nce the 'enterprise' has been established, the 'pattern' element
is usually not difficult to prove. Because of the significant number
of offenses that are committed on a daily basis through the
operation of a drug enterprise, the prosecution can tie drug charges
to other charges, such as violent crimes, in order to establish the
.pattern.'
Id.
182. Compare18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) with MiNN. STAT. § 609.902, subd. 4. Prosecution
of gangs under federal RICO is easier because the federal statute broadly defines a
pattern of racketeering to include:
(A] ny act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson,
robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in
a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102
of the Controlled Substances Act), which is chargeable under State
law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year ....
18 U.S.C. § 1961.
183. See Bonney, supranote 11, at 604; Donovan, supra note 34, at 561; vitter, supra
note 34, at 1424-27.
184. 938 F.2d 1553 (2nd Cir. 1991), cea. denieA 503 U.S. 941 (1992).
185. Id. at 1556.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1560-61. The court found
there was ample evidence demonstrating that the Westies, as an
ongoing association-in-fact, controlled criminal activities on the West
Side piers, and extorted jobs and payments from several labor
unions. Further, the government showed that the Westies entered
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the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise, such as the Westies,
is often more easily shown by what the enterprise does than by an
analysis of its structure.1 8 Moreover, the court held, "we have
previously indicated that proof of various racketeering acts may be
relied on to establish the existence of the charged enterprise.""8 9
The Eighth Circuit has also held that the criminal activities of gang
members can be prosecuted under RICO. In United States v.
Darden,1"° the court considered whether the defendants' involvement
in a St. Louis drug trafficking syndicate constituted racketeering.'9 1
Specifically, the court examined whether the distinctiveness requirement for proof of the existence of a RICO enterprise had been
satisfied.192 While the court acknowledged that proof of an enterprise and pattern of racketeering may coincide, the court applied the
minority test requiring an ascertainable structure distinct from that
inherent in the pattern of racketeering.'
Similar to the Minnesota Supreme Court in Huynh, the Dardencourt
held that the enterprise characteristic may be met by evidence of the
organization's activities extending beyond that required for the
commission of the underlying criminal acts. 94 The Eighth Circuit
held, citing the reasoning of Coonan, that "[c]ommon sense suggests
that the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily
proven by what it does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure." 95 The Darden court relied, however, upon evidence of the

into an alliance with the Gambino Organized Crime Family,
suggesting that other criminal organizations perceived the Westies
as an ongoing enterprise.
Id. at 1560.
188. Coonan, 938 F.2d at 1559 (citing United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 56 (2nd
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983)). The Second Circuit's RICO test in Coonan
supports the activities-based test in Huynh, with one critical difference. Under the
broad definition of an enterprise adopted by the Second Circuit, there is no
distinctiveness requirement. The Second Circuit and other circuit courts that adhere
to a broader view of a RICO enterprise will determine that the organizational
requirement is satisfied "so long as the court can find an informal association of
individuals banded together for the purpose of conducting activities that constitute
predicate acts ...

."

Gardiner, supra note 32, at 687.

189. Coonan, 938 F.2d at 1560 (citing United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 853
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 841, and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985)).
190. 70 F.3d 1507 (8th Cir. 1995).
191. Id. at 1516-17.
192. Id. at 1520.
193. Id.; see United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 664-65 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1040 (1982).

194. Id.
195. Darden,70 F.3d at 1521. In an unusual juxtaposition, the Eighth Circuit, which

adheres to the distinctiveness requirement, is citing the Second Circuit, which applies
the broadest test in determining the existence of an enterprise.
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gang's coordination and oversight activities, including "post-shooting
reviews to improve the techniques it employed to snuff out rivals and
informants," to decide that evidence of the distinct structure was
overwhelming. 96 This recent decision, therefore, seems to indicate
that although the Eighth Circuit recognized the same evidence may
help establish the enterprise and pattern elements, the court will
continue to apply the distinctiveness requirement.
Although federal prosecutors have successfully used RICO to
prosecute street gangs, far fewer RICO prosecutions have been brought
under state "little RICO" statutes. 97 A 1993 U.S. Department of
Justice Survey of local prosecutors found that the reasons cited for lack
of use at the state level include the high standards of proof, the
possibility of failure, and the legal complexity of the statute. 9 For
example, prosecutors for Minnesota's Hennepin and Ramsey counties
report that their drug cases involve less sophisticated and structured
group crime than the Minnesota Legislature anticipated when RICO
was enacted.'
These drug crimes, therefore, are being prosecuted as substantive
crimes instead of as RICO crimes."° Ramsey County Attorney Susan
Gaertner and Hennepin County Attorney Michael Freeman agreed
with survey participants that when prosecuting drug offense cases, state
and drug forfeiture statutes are simpler to present to juries and carry
enhanced penalties. °' Moreover, state and local prosecutors pointed
out the extensive resources required to conduct the investigation
necessary to prove the structured existence of the gang and that the
crimes are gang related. 0 2 Furthermore, sentencing under RICO is
less certain, since RICO is not included in the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines, and thus trial courts have wider discretion when sentenc-

196. Id.
197. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, LOCAL PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME:
THE USE OF STATE RICO STATUTES 2-4 (1993).
"Little RICO" statutes have been
enacted in more than 25 states, including Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi,

Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and
Wisconsin. Id. at 3.
198. Id. at 12-16.
199. Freeman Interview, supra note 87. Mr. Freeman stated that "Our gangs in
Minnesota have not turned out to be as tightly structured as we thought they would be
when we enacted RICO. We do not have the same kind of settled or established
territorial boundaries here as gangs do in other parts of the country." Id.; see also
Gaertner Interview, supra note 163.
200. Freeman Interview, supra note 87; Gaermer Interview, supra note 163.
201. Freeman Interview, supra note 87; Gaermer Interview, supra note 163.
202. Freeman Interview, supra note 87; Gaertner Interview, supra note 163.
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One reason RICO is attractive to state and local prosecutors,
however, is that its criminal penalties can be more severe than those
available for violations of the incorporated crimes. 2°4 The type of
case where RICO's penalties provide such an incentive is illustrated by
Huynh.2°5 The prosecution combined the extortion and money
laundering crimes, which under state criminal statutes carry a penalty
of presumptive probation.2 6 If prosecuted under RICO, however,
the crimes would result in a prison sentence. 20 7 Similarly, as in Kelly,
RICO has been used to target prostitution because prosecutors may
confiscate
ill-gotten profits and the penalties are more severe under
8
20

RICO.

A second reason RICO should be used to target gangs is the
potential of Minnesota's gangs becoming more sophisticated with
hierarchies and control structures as in other jurisdictions where gangs
have been successfully prosecuted under RICO. 2 ' The more recent
threat of gun trafficking by street gangs is the type of crime that the

203. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 4 (Aug. 1, 1995) (comment II.A.05 of Minnesota

Sentencing Guidelines states that for offenses not included in the Offense Severity Level
Table, "judges should exercise their discretion by assigning an offense a severity level
which they believe to be appropriate").
204.

See supra text accompanying note 94.

205. State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191, 197 n.7 (Minn. 1994). The trial judge
determined that the defendant's crime involved serious gang activity and went on for
a long time, justifying a level VIII ranking. Id. at 198. Huynh received a 146-month
prison term. Id. at 193. The supreme court subsequently held that the sentence was
within the trial court's discretion ruling "[t]he legislature clearly intended to punish
severely those persons who engage in racketeering." Id. at 198.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Freeman Interview, supra note 87; Gaermer Interview, supra note 163. In
1991, in the first RICO prosecution in Ramsey County, prosecutors targeted St. Paul
madam Rebecca Rand, charging her with promotion of prostitution, solicitation of
prostitution, concealing criminal proceeds, engaging in a business of concealing
criminal proceeds, and racketeering. The Ramsey County Attorney's Office has "used
and will continue to use RICO for cases such as prostitution and other kinds of quasilegitimate enterprises-Rebecca Rand is an example. In these kinds of cases, it's easier
to use RICO because there is a supposedly legitimate enterprise being used as a front
for illegal activity." Gaertner Interview, supra note 163.
209. The Ramsey County Attorney stated that
The primary utility of RICO for us is to get at gangs that have an
inherent structure, which goes beyond the predicate criminal
acts ....

It's difficult and resource intensive at the investigative

stage to gather evidence of a gang's structure. Gangs don't file
articles of incorporation, they don't generally publicize their 'officer
holders' titles.
See Gaertner Interview, supra note 163.
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Minnesota Legislature sought to eradicate with Minnesota's RICO
Act.2 10 Moreover, the penalties available for the substantive crimes
would be less serious than if the gun trafficking were prosecuted under
RICO. Yet, street gangs concentrating in a certain type of criminal
activity such as gun trafficking, could not be effectively prosecuted
under the supreme court's test, if proof of the gang's activities cannot
serve as proof of the criminal organization.
In sum, the definition of a RICO enterprise and its proof requirements under the new Minnesota test realistically should be clarified
through an evolution of common law. Minnesota courts should
eliminate the Eighth Circuit's distinctiveness requirement, which was
not envisioned by Minnesota RICO sponsors. 21 1 Eventually, however,
the U.S. Supreme Court should grant certiorari and resolve the
controversy among the federal circuits.
In addition, Congress and the Minnesota Legislature should amend
the definition of a RICO enterprise, particularly association-in-fact
enterprises,1 2 which has generated much controversy over how
broadly RICO should be construed. 3 Minnesota lawmakers need to
precisely define the scope of Minnesota's RICO Act and eliminate
confusion
over what types of criminal enterprises RICO is target214
ing.
Without legislative clarification, Minnesota courts will continue to

210. In 1989, former Sen. Michael Freeman, sponsor of the Senate Bill, testified that
"[w]e think that some of the important organized crime outfits of the 1990s will be
drug gangs---that they are sophisticated and that they are organized." Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct: Hearings on S.F. 483, Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., CriminalJustice Division, 76th Minn. Leg., 1989-90 Reg. Sess. (1989). Freeman
further testified that "[d] rug dealing and violent crimes are increasingly part and parcel
of organized gang activity." Id.
Rep. Phil Carruthers is disappointed that RICO has not been used more frequently
in criminal prosecutions at the county and state levels. Gang-related crimes, most
notably drug crimes, are being charged as substantive crimes instead of under
Minnesota RICO. Carruthers Interview, supra note 87.
211. See Freeman Interview, supra note 87. Freeman opined that "( t ] he Minnesota
Supreme Court has read in a limitation we didn't contemplate. The court is limiting
RICO further than we intended." Freeman Interview, supra note 87. For a discussion
on the legislative history of Minnesota's RICO statute, see supra Part II.D and text
accompanying note 210.
212. MINN. STAT. § 609.902, subd. 3.
213. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
214. Minnesota Rep. Phil Carruthers would like the Minnesota RICO Act amended
so that it mirrors the federal statute, which is broader than Minnesota's. "I would like
to go back to the bill as I introduced it ....
I would support legislative efforts to
broaden Minnesota's law." Carruthers Interview, suPra note 87. Carruthers' version of
Minnesota RICO as introduced in the House of Representatives was modeled after the
federal statute, and later changed in conference committee. Carruthers Interview, supra
note 87.
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apply a test that may exclude RICO's use against the newest criminal
threat, street gangs.215 RICO is a powerful weapon that prosecutors
and law enforcement should be able to use against gang-generated
crime. The legislative history of the federal statute supports such an
application in both federal courts and in Minnesota, which largely
patterned its statute after the federal Act. RICO should be used, as
Congress intended, against "sophisticated, diversified and widespread
activity that drains billions of dollars from America's economy 16by
unlawful conduct and illegal use of force, fraud and corruption."
V.

CONCLUSION

The Minnesota Supreme Court's activities-based test for a RICO
enterprise has not been widely applied. If the new prong of the
court's three-prong test is satisfied only by showing that the criminal
activities are beyond what is needed to commit the underlying

215. See Bonney, supranote 11, at 609 (noting that sophisticated urban street gangs
satisfy the enterprise and pattern requirements because they are united for a common
business purpose with core members in a hierarchical order).
216. Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452,84 Stat.
922 (1970). Additionally, the congressional findings and purpose of the federal RICO
act provided that:
(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated,
diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal
use of force, fraud, and corruption;
(2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through
money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling,
loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation
and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other
forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor
unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4)
organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability
of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and
competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously
burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic
security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its
citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of
defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the
development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring
criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the
sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in
the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to
deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.
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predicate offenses, then such a test is problematic for the wellorganized but singular-purpose criminal organization. Furthermore,
the test does not clearly define how to distinguish activities that are
necessary and inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity from
criminal activity that is sufficiently separate and distinct. The court's
inconsistent interpretation of what constitutes necessary and inherent
is exemplified by Kelly and Huynh.
On the other hand, if the new test means that the court will require
separate proof of an organizational control system or structure, RICO
prosecution of wholly criminal entities will be more difficult. The new
test suggests a continued adherence to the Eighth Circuit's distinctiveness or separateness requirement, potentially eliminating those cases
where the facts used to prove the existence of an illegitimate enterprise
217
overlap with those used to prove the pattern of racketeering.
Under the hypothetical set forth in the introduction to this Case
Note, the gang solely organized to sell and distribute illegal drugs
would fail to satisfy the Eighth Circuit's test for the existence of a
RICO enterprise. The drug-related criminal activity would not provide
sufficient evidence of an "ascertainable structure" separate and apart
from that needed to commit the underlying predicate acts.
Under the position adopted by the majority of circuit courts,
however, which rejects this distinctiveness requirement, the hypothetical could result in a racketeering conviction. While Minnesota courts
have correctly held that the enterprise and pattern of racketeering
must be established as separate elements, the Minnesota Supreme
Court should discard the distinctiveness requirement to analyze
whether an enterprise exists. Such a requirement narrows the requisite
proof for a RICO enterprise beyond what the U.S. Supreme Court,
state courts or federal laws have mandated.
Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court needs to reiterate the proof
requirements noted in Turkette, evidence of the enterprise and pattern
of racketeering elements can coalesce.2 18 Disagreements between
federal and state courts over the proper interpretation of the enterprise element would be resolved by statutory amendments more
precisely defining what constitutes a RICO enterprise. Any statutory
amendments, however, should retain the legislative intent and statutory
directives that RICO be broadly construed. Furthermore, the Minnesota Legislature should amend the racketeering statute to explicitly
reflect the evolution of structured criminal organizations beyond
traditional organized crime, to enhance prosecutorial efforts to target
217. See Barsoomian, supra note 35, at 929 (noting that the multiple schemes
requirement is not found in RICO's statutory language).
218. For further discussion of how proof of the enterprise and pattern elements may
coalesce, see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
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street gangs, the modem day version of "organized crime."
Gail A. Feichtinger
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